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Foreign capital, Non-Traded Goods and Welfare in a Developing 
Economy in the presence of Externalities 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In a two-commodity, two-factor full-employment setting for a small open economy, 
an inflow of foreign capital with complete repatriation of foreign capital income does 
not change social welfare. However, in the presence of a tariff the result is different.  
Brecher and Alejandro (1977) have found that inflows of foreign capital are 
necessarily immiserizing if the import-competing sector is capital-intensive and is 
protected by a tariff. Here welfare is defined as a positive function of national income. 
An inflow of foreign capital leads to an expansion of the capital intensive import-
competing sector thereby cutting back the volume of trade further for a small open 
economy and moves it further away from the free trade situation, which is the optimal 
policy. In the literature, the Brecher-Alejandro proposition has also been re-examined 
in terms of three-sector full-employment models like Beladi and Marjit (1992a, 
1992b) with the third sector being a duty-free zone. 
 
As the developing countries are plagued by economic dualism of different types, 
factor market distortions and structural rigidities, some attempts have been made to 
analyze the welfare impact of foreign capital inflow using a Harris-Todaro (1970) 
framework1. For example, Khan (1982) has considered a mobile capital Harris-
Todaro (HT) model with urban unemployment. A third sector, called an urban 
informal sector, which absorbs the unemployed urban workers at a low and 
competitive wage rate, has been introduced in the works of Grinols (1991), Chandra 
and Khan (1993) and Gupta (1997). The immiserizing result of foreign capital in the 
                                               
1
 The introduction of labour market distortion in the form of unionized wage in the urban 
formal sector in an HT structure can in no way affect the welfare result relating to foreign 
capital due to a special property, called ‘envelope property’, implied by this framework. In an 
HT framework, the average wage of labour in the economy is equal to the rural sector wage. 
Once the rural sector wage remains unchanged, there is no labour reallocation effect on 
welfare due to foreign capital inflow, and therefore, results are similar to those obtained in a 
full-employment framework.  
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presence of a tariff protected import competing sector has been found to be valid in 
general2 despite the presence of an additional sector. 
 
Many economists have now successfully been able to show that foreign capital might 
be welfare improving in the developing economies in several cases. The works like 
Marjit and Beladi (1996), Chaudhuri (2005, 2007) and Chaudhuri et al. (2006) have 
demonstrated how foreign capital might produce favourable effects on welfare taking 
into consideration some essential features of the developing economies e.g. existence 
of labour market distortion, presence of the vast informal economy and non-traded 
goods. In particular, as found in the works of Marjit and Beladi (1996) and Chaudhuri 
(2001a), if foreign capital is allowed to enter an intermediate good (internationally 
traded or non-traded) sector only, it may be welfare-improving. Besides, Chaudhuri 
(2005) has shown that even in a 2×2 full-employment structure with tariff and labour 
market distortions, an inflow of foreign capital may be welfare-improving. Also 
Chaudhuri (2007) has found that in an HT structure with agricultural dualism and a 
non-traded final commodity, it is possible to show that an inflow of foreign capital 
might improve social welfare.  
 
A foreign direct investment (FDI) is often accompanied by transfer of superior 
technologies of production that raises the productivity of the workers in the capital-
receiving countries through externalities. There exists a large theoretical literature 
dealing with such aspects.3 However, this literature has paid very little attention to 
analyzing the consequence of such an FDI-induced technology transfer on the welfare 
of the developing countries using the simple general equilibrium structure. Notable 
exceptions are, however, Chaudhuri (2001b, 2005) where an inflow of foreign capital 
is accompanied by transfer of technology that raises the efficiency of labour and 
hence the effective labour force in efficiency unit. In the former work social welfare 
worsens following an expansion of the tariff-protected, import-competing sector while 
in the latter welfare is likely to improve owing to an increase in aggregate wage 
                                               
2
 Grinols (1991) is, of course, a notable exception.  
 
3
 See for example, Markusen (1995, 2002), Norback and Persson (2002), Neary (2002, 2003), 
Markusen and Venables (1999), Mattoo et al. (2004), Blalock and Gertler (2008) etc. 
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income although the protected sector expands. However, externalities due to an FDI 
may well occur through changes in intersectoral composition of output even in the 
absence of any technology transfer. The present paper purports to analyze such a case 
where an FDI may expand a non-traded sector that produces a final good (services) 
whose consumption directly raises the efficiency of the workers. A three-sector, three- 
factor general equilibrium model has been developed. There are two types of capital, 
of which capital of type K  is used in all the three sectors of the economy and capital 
of type N is specific to the non-traded sector. The possibility of welfare improvement 
through an FDI has been explored in the backdrop of a developing economy where 
there are tariff and labour market distortions. 
 
The results of the analysis indicate that an FDI of capital of type N although raises the 
human capital endowment of the economy, may adversely affect social welfare under 
reasonable conditions. On the contrary, an inflow of foreign capital of type K is likely 
to be welfare-improving. Although these effects crucially hinge on different structural 
factors e.g. the degree of labour market imperfection, trade-related and technological 
factors, they can at least question the desirability of allowing entry of foreign capital 
in the non-traded final good sector that generates externalities. As the parameters of 
the model on which the results crucially depend are amenable to policy measures 
these have important policy implications for overpopulated developing countries with 
preponderance of factor market and product market distortions and a large non-traded 
final good (services) sector like healthcare.  
 
2. The Model 
 
We consider a small open developing economy consisting of three sectors: sector 1, 
sector 2 and sector G . Sector 1 produces an agricultural commodity ( 1X ) with labour 
( L ) and capital of type K . Sector 2 uses labour and capital of type K  to produce a 
manufacturing commodity ( 2X ). Finally, sector G  is a non-traded sector that uses 
labour and two types of capital, K  and N , to produce a final commodity 
(services), GX . It is assumed that sector 1 is the export sector, sector 2 is the import-
competing sector and sector G  is the producer of a non-traded final good (services) 
which is consumed domestically. The import-competing sector (sector 2) is protected 
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by an import tariff.4 Workers in the agricultural sector earn the competitive wage, W , 
while the wage rate in the manufacturing sector and the non-traded sector is *W , 
which is institutionally determined, and *W W> . So we have labour market 
distortions.5 Due to the assumption of a small open economy, prices of commodities 1 
and 2 are internationally given. Since commodity (services) G  is internationally non-
traded, its price is determined domestically by demand and supply forces. While 
labour is imperfectly mobile, capital of type K  is perfectly mobile between all the 
sectors of the economy. Capital of type N  is specific to sectorG  and is entirely 
owned by foreign capitalists6 so that the return from it is fully repatriated. The 
endowments of the three primary inputs in the economy are ,L K and N , respectively. 
All the factors of production are fully employed. Production functions in sectors 1 and 
2 exhibit constant returns to scale with diminishing marginal productivity to each 
factor. In sector G  we have fixed-coefficient technology.7 Finally, commodity 1 is 
assumed to be the numeraire so that 1 1P = .  
 
 
 
                                               
4
 It is a well-known trade-theoretic result that in a small open economy the optimal tariff is 
zero. However, the government in a developing economy like India finds no alternative but to 
keep some tariffs on importables owing to political pressures keeping in view the employment 
preserving effects of tariffs. Furthermore, in a developing economy with multiple distortions 
the effect(s) of any parametric changes on social welfare might change enormously compared 
to the one distortion case. This is because the effects of different distortions might move in 
the two opposite directions nullifying each other’s effects. Hence the net welfare effect 
depends on the relative magnitudes of different effects.   
 
5
 An employment subsidy in the form of a wage subsidy by the same rate in the two 
unionized sectors is not advisable in the present context because of the following reasons. It 
lowers the effective wage cost of labour in the two unionized sectors and raises the return to 
capital of type K  i.e. r  (see Equation 2). This lowers the competitive wage,W (see Equation 
1) of the common workers. In a large democratic developing country like India, the 
implementation of this policy would be vehemently opposed by political parties on the ground 
that it would increase poverty and income inequality.    
 
6
 This is only a simplifying assumption. It may be intuitively checked that the qualitative 
results of the model remain unaltered even if the stock of capital of type N consists of both 
domestic and foreign capital, which are perfect substitutes. 
  
7
 The use of fixed-coefficient technology in the non-traded sector (sector G ) makes focusing 
on the externality sharper and easily tractable. I am thankful to the anonymous referee for 
giving this helpful suggestion.  
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The general equilibrium is represented by the following set of equations. 
1 1 1L KWa ra+ =          (1) 
* *
2 2 2 2(1 ) PL KW a ra P t+ = + =   (2) 
*
LG KG NG GW a ra Ra P+ + =   (3) 
 
Here, jia  is the amount of the j th input required to produce one unit output of the i  th 
sector for, i = 1, 2, G ; and, , ,j L K N= . Besides, r and R are the returns to capital of 
type K  and capital of type N , respectively. t  is the ad-valorem tariff rate on the 
import of good 2. *2 2( (1 ))P P t= +  is the effective or tariff-inclusive price of 
commodity 2. Finally, GP is the price of the non-traded good (services), G , which is 
domestically determined. 
 
Equations (1) – (3) are the competitive industry equilibrium conditions in the three 
sectors. 
 
The average efficiency of the workers, h , is considered to be a positive function of the 
total amount of production (and hence consumption) of commodity, G 8 and is given 
by 
'( ); 0Gh h X h= >  (4) 
 
Hence the labour endowment in efficiency unit is given by 
1 1 2 2 ( )L L LG G Ga X a X a X h X+ + =  (5) 
where Li ia X is the employment of labour (in efficiency unit) in the i th sector of the 
economy for 1, 2,i G= .         
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 This is easily comprehensible if we call sector G, healthcare. It is assumed that the average 
efficiency of the workers depends on their health conditions. This is particularly true in the 
developing countries, where dearth of adequate medical facilities and infrastructure impinges 
severely on the health of workers, leading to deterioration in their efficiency or productivity. 
Therefore, an expansion in the healthcare sector is expected to raise their efficiency. 
 
 7 
It should be pointed out at this stage that sector G  uses LG Ga X  efficiency units of 
labour apart from two types of capital in its production to produce GX  units of 
commodityG . The production of commodity G , which is fully consumed by workers 
(domestic consumers), raises the average efficiency of the workers through creation of 
externalities. If GX  rises by one per cent, sector G  employs LGλ  per cent of the 
labour force additionally while it raises the labour force in efficiency unit by Gε  per 
cent in the margin, where (.)( . ) 0(.)
G
G
G
Xdh
dX h
ε = > is the elasticity of the labour efficiency 
function, ( )Gh X , with respect to GX . It is sensible to assume that sector G  (say, 
healthcare) is a net supplier of labour input in efficiency unit which implies that 
LG Gλ ε< . 
 
Complete utilization of capital of type K  and capital of type N  can be expressed 
respectively as follows. 
1 1 2 2K K KG G D Fa X a X a X K K K+ + = + =  (6) 
NG Ga X N=  (7) 
where DK and FK are domestic and foreign components of endowment of capital of 
type K . DK and FK are perfect substitutes. N denotes the stock of capital of 
type N which is completely owned by foreign capitalists.9 Foreign capital incomes of 
both types are fully repatriated. 
  
Since the consumption of the non-traded final good (services) creates externalities its 
free market provision is not optimal and therefore, there should be a consumption 
subsidy from the perspective of social welfare. The consumers receive a subsidy on 
the consumption of commodity G  at the ad-valorem rate, s . So the effective price of 
commodity G  that the consumers face is * (1 )G GP P s= − . This subsidy is financed by a 
                                               
9
 This is only a simplifying assumption. It may be intuitively checked that the qualitative 
results of the model remain unaltered even if the stock of capital of type N consists of both 
domestic and foreign capital, which are perfect substitutes. 
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portion of the tariff revenue earned by the government from the import of commodity 
2.10 
 
Let iD denote the aggregate demand for the i th commodity by the consumers 
for 1, 2,i G= . The aggregate demand function for the non-traded final commodity 
(services) is given by 
*( , )
               (-) (+)
G G GD D P Y=
 (8) 
This implies that the demand for commodityG  has the usual own price and income 
effects. 
                
The consumption subsidy on commodityG , denoted, z , is financed by a portion of 
the tariff revenue earned by the government from the import of commodity 2 and is 
given by 
G GsP D z=  (9) 
 
The demand function for the import commodity, denoted 2D ,  is given by 
*
2 2 2( , )
              (-) (+) 
D D P Y=
   (10) 
 
All commodities are normal with negative and positive own price and income 
elasticities of demand, respectively. Commodity G  is a necessary good having a low 
own price elasticity of demand (in absolute terms). It does not depend on the relative 
price of commodity 2, *2P , so that the cross-price elasticity is zero. We make the 
simplifying assumption that the levels of demand for the other two commodities do 
                                               
10
 In the standard trade theory, it is usually assumed that the government collects the tariff 
revenue from the import of the importables (commodity 2 in the present case) and pays it 
back to the consumers in a lump-sum manner. In this case, from the aggregate tariff revenue 
the government holds back z amount (exogenously fixed) for financing the consumption 
subsidy and the rest is transferred to the consumers in a non-distortionary fashion.  
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not depend on the relative price of commodity G  i.e. 1 2
* *
( ), ( ) 0
G G
D D
P P
∂ ∂
=
∂ ∂
.
11
 
Commodities 1 and 2 are, however, gross substitutes implying 1
*
2
( ) 0D
P
∂
>
∂
. 
 
The national income at domestic prices, denoted ,Y  is given by 
*
1 2 2 2 2 2( )G G FY X P X P X tP D X rK RN z= + + + − − − −  (11) 
where 2 2 2[ ( ) ]tP D X z− − is the tariff revenue net of the subsidy on consumption of 
good G  which is transferred to the consumers in a lump-sum fashion. All foreign 
capital incomes are completely repatriated.  
     
Since commodity (services) G  is consumed domestically, its supply is circumscribed 
by its demand. Therefore, in equilibrium, we have 
G GD X=  (12) 
 
In this model there are three types of distortion namely, commodity market distortion 
in the form of an import tariff on sector 2, labour market distortion in the form of 
exogenously given unionized wage in sector 2 and sector G and the presence of a non-
traded final good (services), the consumption of which creates externalities. Since the 
consumption of the non-traded final good (services) creates externalities there is a 
consumption subsidy from the perspective of social welfare. If there were only labour 
market distortion or tariff distortion, economic liberalization policies like labour 
market reform or trade reform would have been the right approach to remove 
distortion and improve social welfare. Other distortions are not easy to be removed 
completely for many reasons. Political intervention is one of the most important 
reasons.
12
  
                                               
11
 It may be verified that even if the levels of demand for the other two commodities depend 
positively on *GP , implying commodities to be gross substitutes, all the results of the model 
continue to hold under an additional sufficient condition involving the term, 2
*
( )
G
D
P
∂
∂
. 
12
 Although the developing economies have chosen free trade as their development strategy 
and been implementing liberalized economic policies for the last two decades or so they are 
yet to proceed a long way in liberalizing their economies sufficiently as desired by the 
international institutions like the IMF and the World Bank. In a developing country like India, 
 10 
There are twelve endogenous variables, 1 2 2, , , , , , , , , ,G G GW r R P s h X X X D D  and Y  that 
can be solved from the above twelve equations. The solution techniques of the 
endogenous variables are as follows. r  is obtained from equation (1) as *W is 
exogenously given. Plugging the value of r in equation (1), W  is found. Equation (3) 
determines R  as function of GP . Then GX  is solved from equation (7) as function of 
GP . Plugging of GX  in equations ((5) and (6)) and solving yield the values of 1X  and 
2X again as functions of GP . Substituting 2D from equation (10) in equation (11) Y is 
also obtained as function of GP . Inserting Y in equation (10) 2D is found. Also, 
substituting Y in equation (8) one can find GD as functions of s  and GP . Then from 
equation (9) s  comes out as function of GP . Finally, GP is determined from equation 
(12). Once GP  is known, the values of the other variables are also known. This is an 
indecomposable system. AlthoughW and r  are obtained from the price system alone, 
R  cannot be solved from the price system alone. Therefore, any changes in factor 
endowments affect R . 13 
 
The demand side of the model is represented by a strictly quasi-concave social 
welfare function. Let V  denote the social welfare that depends on the consumption of 
output of the three sectors denoted by 1D , 2D and GD , and is depicted as 
1 2( , , )GV V D D D=                   (13) 
 
The balance of trade equilibrium requires that 
1 2 2 1 2 2 FD P D X P X rK RN+ = + − −  (14) 
or equivalently, 
* * *
1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2( )G G G G FD P D P D X P X P X tP D X rK RN z+ + = + + + − − − −  (14.1)
                                           
                                                                                                                                       
there are still a lot of structural rigidities, technological and economic backwardness and 
different types of dualism which need to be removed fast for achieving high rate of economic 
growth and development. However, in many cases in a democratic set-up the political parties 
stand in the way of implementing reformatory policies at the desired pace. 
 
13
 Any changes in factor endowments cannot affect factor-coefficients in sector 1 and sector 2 
as W and r do not change. Besides, in sector G we have fixed-coefficient technology of 
production. So, all jia s do not change due to changes in factor endowments.   
 11 
The volume of import of good 2, denoted M , is given by the following equation. 
*
2 2 2( , )M D P Y X= −            (15)                                                                          
 
3. Comparative Static Exercises 
 
In the present model where the average efficiency of labour is determined 
endogenously by the size of sector G  (say, healthcare) an inflow of foreign capital 
apart from increasing the capital stock of the economy may also affect the effective 
labour endowment measured in efficiency unit due to externalities. It will affect the 
output composition, price of the non-traded good and social welfare. In this backdrop 
we examine the effects of foreign capital of both types on national welfare and the 
human capital stock of the economy.  
 
The human capital stock, denoted C , is the total labour endowment of the economy in 
efficiency unit which is written as follows. 
( )GC h X=  (16) 
 
3.1 Effects of inflow of capital of type K  
 
In order to examine the effects of an inflow of foreign capital of type K  on social 
welfare and human capital stock of the economy, it is assumed that ˆ 0K > , while all 
other parameters remain unchanged. Here the ‘^’ symbol suggests proportionate 
change. 
 
Differentiating equations (3), (5) – (13), (14.1) and (15) the following results can be 
proved.14 
 
 
 
 
                                               
14
 The derivations can be obtained from the author on request. 
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(i) 
ˆ
( ) 0
ˆ
GP
K
>  iff * 2 2( ) LW W a tP− > ; 
(ii) 1
ˆ
( ) 0
ˆ
X
K
<  and 2
ˆ
( ) 0
ˆ
X
K
> ; 
(iii) 
ˆ
( ) 0
ˆ
GX
K
= ;                                                                          (17) 
(iv) 0dC
dK
= ; and,      
(v) 
1
1( ) 0dV
D dK
>  iff * 2 2( ) LW W a tP− > ;                                                 
  
From (17) the following proposition can now be established. 
Proposition 1: An inflow of foreign capital of type K  leads to an expansion (a 
contraction) of sector 2 (sector 1) and leaves sectorG unaffected. It raises the 
producer price of the product of sector G (say, healthcare) and improves social 
welfare iff 2 2( * ) LW W a tP− > . The human capital stock of the economy, however, 
does not change.15 
 
From (17) the following corollaries readily follow. 
Corollary 1: When *W W= , that is, there is no labour market distortion,
1
1( ) 0dV
D dK
< .  
Corollary 2: When 0t = , that is, there is no tariff restriction, 
1
1( ) 0dV
D dK
> .  
 
From corollary 1 it entails that the presence of any labour market imperfection is a 
necessity for an inflow of foreign capital of type K  to be welfare improving. On the 
other hand, from corollary 2, it is evident that in the absence of any tariff welfare 
unambiguously improves. 
 
                                               
15
 If all commodities are gross substitutes we have 2
*
( ) 0
G
D
P
∂
>
∂
. It can be verified that the 
necessary and sufficient condition under which the results of proposition 1 are obtained does 
not change. 
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We can intuitively explain the results presented in proposition 1 and corollaries 1 and 
2 in the following fashion. Sectors 1 and 2 together form a Heckscher-Ohlin sub-
system (HOSS) since they use the same two inputs. An inflow of capital of type K  
leads to a contraction of sector 1 and an expansion of sector 2 following a Rybczynski 
effect since the latter is more intensive in the use of capital of type K  (with respect to 
labour) than the former. SectorG remains unaffected because of the following 
reasons: (i) production technology of sector G is of fixed coefficient type; and, (ii) the 
endowment of capital of type N , which is specific to sectorG , has not changed. Now, 
as sector 1 contracts, more labour (in efficiency unit) are now absorbed in the higher 
wage-paying unionized sector 2. This is the labour reallocation effect (LRE) that 
raises the aggregate wage income and works positively on social welfare. There is, 
however, an offsetting effect, which is called the tariff revenue effect (TRE). As 
sector 2 expands it lowers the volume of import and hence the tariff revenue net of 
health subsidy, which is transferred to the consumers in a non-distortionary manner, 
declines. This TRE works negatively on welfare. National welfare increases if and 
only if LRE is stronger than TRE, i.e. * 2 2( ) LW W a tP− > . We should note that if 
welfare improves it pushes up the demand for the non-traded final good, G . Its 
supply, however, cannot change for reasons already explained earlier. Therefore, the 
producer price of the good, GP  (and also the consumer price, *GP  ) would adjust 
upwardly to clear the market for good G .16  As GP  rises the value of domestic 
production rises. The value of consumption (demand) by all consumers in the 
economy rises as well. This raises national income and welfare further. Finally, the 
human capital stock measured in efficiency does not change as sector G remains 
unaffected.  
 
In the absence of any labour market distortion, the LRE is zero. Welfare worsens 
following negative TRE. 
 
On the contrary, in the absence of any tariff restrictions, there is no negative TRE. So 
welfare improves unequivocally.   
                                               
16
 As * (1 )G GP s P= −  and G Gz sP X=  (see equation (9) and equation (12)), it is evident that 
*
GP increases more than GP .  
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3.2 Effects of inflow of foreign capital of type N  
 
Let us now find out of the consequences of an inflow of foreign capital of type N  
which is specific to the non-traded final good sector. In this case, it is assumed that 
ˆ 0N > , with all other parameters remaining unchanged. 
 
Differentiating Equations (3), (5) – (13), (14.1) and (15) once more the following 
results can be proved.17 
(vi) 1
ˆ
( ) 0
ˆ
X
N
< ; and, 2
ˆ
( ) 0
ˆ
X
N
> ;  
(vii) 
ˆ
( ) 1 0
ˆ
GX
N
= > ;            
(viii) 0dC
dN
> ;                                                                    (18) 
(ix) 
ˆ
( ) 0
ˆ
GP
N
<
 if * 2 2( ) LW W a tP− ≥ ; and, 
 (x) 
1
1( ) 0dV
V dN
<  if  (i) * 2 2( ) LW W a tP− ≥ ; and,  
                                  (ii) * hz W hLε≥ .    
             
 
These results can be summarized in terms of the following proposition. 
Proposition 2: An inflow of foreign capital of type N (specific to the non-traded 
sector) (a) leads to expansion of both sector G and sector 1 and a contraction of sector 
2; and, (b) an increase in human capital stock. It lowers the producer price of the 
product (services) of sector G (say, healthcare) if * 2 2( ) LW W a tP− ≥ . National welfare 
worsens if additionally, * hz W hLε≥ .  
                                                    
The following corollary also follows from the set of results as given by (18). 
Corollary 3: In the absence of any tariff welfare deteriorates following an inflow of 
foreign capital of type N if * hz W hLε≥ .
18
 
 
                                               
17
 The derivations can be obtained from the author on request. 
 
18
 One can easily derive quite a few alternative sufficient conditions for this result to be valid.  
 15 
Technology in sectorG is of the fixed-coefficient type and capital of type N  is 
specific to this sector. So, if there occurs an inflow of this type of capital, sector G  
expands. The expanding sector G  requires more capital of type K , which must come 
from the other two sectors leading to a Rybczynski type effect (RTE). Consequently, 
sector 2 contracts while sector 1 expands as the former sector is more intensive in the 
use of capital of type K  vis-à-vis sector 1. As sector 1 that pays a lower wage to its 
workers compared to the other two sectors, aggregate wage income falls. This is the 
LRE that works negatively on social welfare. On the other hand, as the tariff-
protected import-competing sector (sector 2) contracts the amount of tariff revenue 
rises via an increase in the volume of imports. The amount of lump-sum transfer (net 
of consumption subsidy) to the consumers rises. This is the TRE that in this case 
works favourably on welfare. However, the negative LRE dominates over the positive 
TRE if * 2 2( ) LW W a tP− ≥ . So these two effects taken together tend to lower not only 
national welfare but also the demand for the non-traded good. On the other hand, as 
sector G  expands the human capital formation gets a boost taking full advantage of 
externalities. The increase in the effective labour force creates additional wage 
income. This we call the labour endowment effect (LEE) that works favourably on 
welfare. This also raises the demand for the non-traded good and exerts an upward 
pressure on its price. As the supply of this good has increased it tends to lower the 
producer price. Therefore, there are two opposite effects on the producer price of the 
good, GP . It can be checked that GP falls if
*
2 2( ) LW W a tP− ≥ and the elasticity of the 
labour efficiency function, hε , is not high.
19
 Now if GP falls the aggregate value of 
domestic production falls. The aggregate value of consumption (demand) by all 
consumers in the economy also falls. This we call the demand value effect (DVE) 
which in the present case works negatively on national welfare. The negative DVE 
outweighs the positive LEE if * 2 2( ) LW W a tP− ≥ and * hz W hLε≥ , and worsens social 
welfare further.20 Thus, we find that social deteriorates following an inflow of foreign 
                                               
19
 Derivations can be obtained from the author on request. 
.  
20
 The sufficient condition, * hz W hLε≥ , implies that the magnitude of consumption 
subsidy (decrease in net lump-sum transfer of tariff revenue to consumers) is not less than the 
additional wage income generated by externalities. However, this is not at all a necessary 
condition. One can derive quite a few numbers of alternative sufficient conditions for the 
results to be valid.   
 16 
capital of type N under the sufficient conditions as presented in proposition 2. It may, 
however, be noted that one can easily derive a couple of alternative sufficient 
conditions which ensure the results to hold.  
 
In the absence of any tariff, there is no positive TRE. There are only negative LRE, 
negative DVE and positive LEE. The net effect of the last two effects is negative 
if * hz W hLε≥ . So, national welfare worsens under this sufficient condition. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
The paper has analyzed the welfare consequence of foreign capital in a small open 
developing economy using a three-sector, three-factor general equilibrium model with 
tariff and labour market distortions and a non-traded sector. The non-traded sector 
produces a final good (services) whose consumption directly raises the efficiency of 
the workers. There are two types of capital, of which capital of type K  is used in all 
the three sectors of the economy while capital of type N is specific to the non-traded 
sector. So an FDI of capital of N type expands the non-traded sector thereby 
emanating externalities.  
 
The analysis has found that an FDI of capital of type N although raises the human 
capital endowment of the economy, may affect social welfare adversely. This 
indicates the possibility of a trade-off between twin economic objectives of the 
government in a developing economy: maintaining high economic growth and 
improvement in human capital formation. On the contrary, an inflow of foreign 
capital of type K is likely to be welfare-improving. Although these effects crucially 
hinge on different structural factors e.g. the degree of labour market imperfection, 
trade-related and technological factors, they can at least question the desirability of 
allowing entry of foreign capital in the non-traded final good sector, especially when 
it generates externalities. As the parameters of the model on which the results 
crucially depend are amenable to policy measures these have important policy 
implications for overpopulated developing countries with preponderance of factor 
market and product market distortions and a large non-traded final good (services) 
sector like healthcare.   
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